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Introduction
Structured ﬁ   nance involves the pooling of assets and 
the subsequent sale to investors of tranched claims on 
the cash ﬂ  ows backed by these pools. It has become an 
increasingly important tool for credit risk transfer. Issuance 
volumes have grown rapidly over recent years (Chart 1), 
paralleling technical advances in credit risk modelling.
Like other forms of credit risk transfer − e.g. credit default 
swaps (CDSs) or pass-through securitisations − structured 
ﬁ  nance instruments can be used to shift credit risk across 
ﬁ   nancial institutions and sectors. Yet, a key difference 
between structured ﬁ   nance and other risk transfer 
products is that, via the tranching of claims, structured 
instruments also transform risk by generating exposures 
to different “slices” of the underlying asset pool’s loss dis-
tribution. As a result of this “slicing” and the contractual 
structures needed to achieve it, tranche risk-return char-
acteristics may be particularly difﬁ  cult to assess. 
Ratings, which are based on the ﬁ  rst moment of a security’s 
loss distribution, have intrinsic limitations in fully gauging 
the risk of tranched securities. While this observation holds 
in principle for any security, it will be argued below that the 
tails of these loss distributions are likely to be more pro-
nounced for structured products (2). As a result, subordinated 
structured ﬁ  nance tranches in particular can be expected to 
be riskier than portfolios of like-rated bonds in that inves-
tors in the former are more heavily exposed to extreme 
loss events. Yet, the complexity of structured ﬁ  nance 
transactions may lead to situations where investors tend to 
rely more heavily on ratings than for other types of rated 
securities. On this basis, the transformation of risk involved 
(1)  The views expressed in this article, which also appears in the BIS Quarterly 
Review June 2005, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those 
of the BIS or the National Bank of Belgium; any errors and omissions are those 
of the authors.
(2)  It should be noted that ratings are not intended to be comprehensive measures 
of risk. This means that the stated limitations relate to their use, not to ratings 
as such. 
in structured ﬁ  nance gives rise to a number of questions 
with important potential implications. One such question is 
whether tranched instruments might result in unanticipated 
concentrations of risk in institutions’ portfolios.











CHART 1  TOTAL FUNDED STRUCTURED FINANCE 
ISSUANCE BY REGION
  (In billions of US dollars ; data includes cash issuance and 
funded portion of synthetics)




For various reasons, some of which are discussed below, 
structured ﬁ  nance products may be more effective than 
other ﬁ   nancial instruments at addressing problems of 
adverse selection and segmentation in ﬁ  nancial markets. 
This has made these products attractive for a variety of 
market participants. Financial intermediaries’ motivations 
for issuing structured ﬁ  nance instruments include access 
to new sources of funding, reduction of economic or 
regulatory capital and arbitrage opportunities. Investor 
interest has been stimulated by portfolio diversiﬁ  cation 
and the expectation of attractive risk-return proﬁ  les in an 
environment of low interest rates.
Recognising the potential of structured ﬁ  nance for risk 
transformation, the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS), which monitors ﬁ   nancial market func-
tioning for the central bank Governors of the G10 
countries, established a working group to explore these 
instruments  (1). This article highlights some of the group’s 
principal ﬁ   ndings in the context of the “complexity” 
and “riskiness” of tranched products. Rating agencies 
and their evaluation approaches are important aspects 
of this discussion. Other aspects, such as potential 
conﬂ  icts of interest related to issuer fee-based ratings, are 
brieﬂ  y mentioned below and covered in more detail in 
CGFS (2005).
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The 
next section brieﬂ  y discusses the economics of structured 
ﬁ  nance markets. This is followed by sections focusing on 
the complexity of structured ﬁ  nance instruments and their 
risk-return characteristics. The last section identiﬁ  es some 
implications for policy makers, researchers and market 
participants.
1.  What is structured ﬁ  nance ?
Structured ﬁ  nance instruments can be deﬁ  ned through 
three distinct characteristics  : (1) pooling of assets (either 
cash-based or synthetically created)  ; (2) de-linking of 
the credit risk of the collateral asset pool from the credit 
risk of the originator, usually through the transfer of 
the underlying assets to a ﬁ  nite-lived, stand-alone special 
purpose vehicle (SPV)  ; and (3) tranching of liabilities that 
are backed by the asset pool. While the ﬁ  rst two char-
acteristics are also present with classical pass-through 
securitisations, the tranching of liabilities sets structured 
ﬁ  nance products apart  (2).
A key aspect of the tranching process is the ability to 
create one or more classes of securities whose rating is 
higher than the average rating of the underlying collateral 
asset pool or to generate rated securities from a pool of 
unrated assets. This is accomplished through the use of 
credit support speciﬁ  ed within the transaction structure 
to create securities with different risk-return proﬁ  les. 
The priority ordering of payments offers one example of 
credit support  : the equity/ﬁ  rst-loss tranche absorbs initial 
losses up to the level where it is depleted, followed by 
mezzanine tranches which absorb some additional losses, 
again followed by more senior tranches. The credit sup-
port resulting from the priority ordering means that the 
most senior claims are expected to be insulated – except 
in particularly adverse circumstances – from the default 
risk of the asset pool through the absorption of losses by 
subordinated claims.
Each of the three key characteristics of structured ﬁ  nance 
contributes to “value creation” and to the attractiveness 
of structured ﬁ   nance markets for a variety of market 
participants. (Chart 2 illustrates the range of participants 
involved in a generic structured ﬁ  nance transaction). In 
this context, de-linking confers beneﬁ  ts similar to those of 
secured credit, with the additional feature that the income 
streams from the de-linked assets will tend to be more 
predictable than those of the ongoing ﬁ  rm. An important 
question relating to the pooling and tranching character-
istics of structured ﬁ  nance is under what circumstances 
the tranching of liabilities, which is costly, can create value 
above and beyond that of pooling only (e.g. through 
“pass-through” securitisation). Answers to this question 
relate to the nature of imperfections in ﬁ  nancial markets. 
For example, the presence of adverse selection and/or 
market segmentation can lead to situations where 
tranching adds value. When the originating institution 
has more information about the potential cash ﬂ  ows 
from the asset pool than do outside investors, or when 
one group of investors has more information or ability to 
value the assets than others, it may be optimal to issue 
a senior tranche (i.e. debt), which is at least partially 
insulated from default and purchased by lesser informed 
investors, and a junior tranche (i.e. equity), to be acquired 
by more informed investors or retained by the originating 
institution  (3). Indeed, banks typically hold the equity 
tranches of the collateralised loan obligations they issue. 
Market information also suggests that the more junior 
(1)  The Working Group on the role of ratings in structured ﬁ  nance was chaired 
by Peter Praet of the National Bank of Belgium. Its report, CGFS (2005), and a 
number of background papers authored by working group members are available 
online at www.bis.org. See also CGFS (2003).
(2)  In the remainder of this article, the term “traditional ABS” will be used for 
structured ﬁ  nance securities backed by large homogeneous asset pools, such 
as credit cards and auto loans. This contrasts with CDOs, themselves part of 
the ABS universe, which are backed by smaller pools of more heterogeneous 
assets, including assets such as bonds sourced in secondary markets and 
“unconventional” assets, such as tranches of other ABSs and CDOs. 
(3)  Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) show in a general context that it may be optimal 
for ﬁ  rms facing informed and uninformed investors to issue both debt and equity. 
For a review of literature relating more speciﬁ  cally to asymmetric information and 
market segmentation in structured ﬁ  nance markets, see Mitchell (2004). Ashcraft 
(2004) and Amato and Remolona (2003) present illustrations of value creation via 
arbitrage CDOs.129
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tranches of structured products are often bought by spe-
cialist credit investors, while the senior tranches appear to 
be more attractive for a broader, less specialised investor 
community. 
Similarly, segmented ﬁ  nancial markets − due, for example, 
to the existence of investors with ratings-based invest-
ment mandates − may make it attractive for structured 
ﬁ  nance arrangers to create new assets with desired loss 
characteristics for particular investor classes. Investors 
beneﬁ   t, as structuring helps to “complete” otherwise 
incomplete ﬁ   nancial markets  ; for example by enabling 
investors constrained to invest in highly-rated securities 
to gain exposure to asset classes, such as leveraged loans, 
whose performance across the business cycle may differ 
from that of other eligible assets.
Whereas tranching claims may help to overcome certain 
market imperfections, it also introduces problems related 
to governance and to the question of who, if anyone, 
should take responsibility for restructuring the portfolio 
if some of the underlying assets become nonperforming. 
As is discussed in the next section, equity tranche holders 
may have an incentive to increase risk and return, whereas 
senior tranche holders have an incentive to minimise 
defaults in the asset portfolio. In addition, if third-party 
asset managers are required to hold the equity tranche 
of a transaction in order to control problems of moral 
hazard, then their incentives will be in conﬂ  ict with the 
senior investor classes. Indeed, much of the contractual 
structure of tranched products amounts to an exercise in 
“complete contracting”, detailing the rights and responsi-
bilities of the asset manager, noteholders, and other third 
parties involved in the transaction. In practice, these provi-
sions − which take the place of discretionary control rights 
granted to equity investors in ordinary, long-lived ﬁ  rms − 
have evolved substantially over time, often in response 
to poor transaction performance due to unanticipated, 
opportunistic behaviour by certain participants. 
2.  The complexity of structured ﬁ  nance
2.1  Sources of complexity
Pooling and tranching, while being key sources of value in 
structured ﬁ  nance, are also the main factors behind what 
might be called the “complexity” of these instruments. As 
far as pooling is concerned, evaluation of risk and return 
of a structured ﬁ  nance security necessitates modelling the 
loss distribution of the underlying asset pool, which may 
be complicated when the pool consists of a small number 
of heterogeneous assets. However, as tranching adds an 
extra layer of analytical complexity, the evaluation of a 
structured ﬁ  nance instrument (in other words, a tranche) 
cannot be conﬁ  ned to analysing asset pool loss. It is also 
necessary to model the distribution of cash ﬂ  ows from 
CHART 2  STRUCTURED FINANCE : KEY MARKET PARTICIPANTS




























evaluate credit risk / deal structure, assess third parties, interact with investors, and issue rating
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the asset pool to the tranches  ; that is, to evaluate the 
deal’s speciﬁ  c structural features. These features, deﬁ  ned 
via covenants, may entail sets of rules for the allocation 
of principal and interest payments received from the col-
lateral pool and for the redirection of these cash ﬂ  ows in 
the case of stress situations, in addition to specifying the 
rights and duties of various third parties involved in the 
transaction  (1).
As a result, structured ﬁ   nance instruments give rise to 
“non-default” risks – ie risks that are unrelated to defaults 
in the collateral pool, but which nevertheless affect the 
credit risk of issued tranches  (2). One source of non-default 
risk arises from the conﬂ  icts of interest among tranche 
holders. For example, senior note holders are promised 
interest during the life of the transaction and a principal 
payment at maturity. Equity holders have no promised 
principal payment  ; therefore, they have an interest in 
see(k)ing high up-front payouts before defaults begin 
to deplete their tranche holdings. By implication, to the 
extent that equity investors can inﬂ  uence initial portfolio 
selection, they may be willing to sacriﬁ  ce credit quality in 
exchange for enhanced yield payments, eg, by including 
credits with wide spreads for given rating levels. 
To try to control such conﬂ  icts, CDOs and other tranched 
products rely extensively on structural provisions based 
on loss triggers and threshold levels (eg overcollateralisa-
tion and interest rate coverage tests). These tests, when 
“failed”, divert cash ﬂ  ow to protect senior note holders. 
In this context, preservation of “excess spread”, which 
represents the difference between the income earned on 
the collateral assets in a given period and the contracted 
payments to the tranched liabilities, has become a key 
structural feature. As a result, the excess spread now 
tends to be held in a reserve fund rather than being 
distributed to equity tranche investors immediately. This 
serves to make pay-outs more back-loaded, cushioning 
the performance of senior notes.
Performance of third parties constitutes another source 
of non-default risk  (3). Servicer performance, in particu-
lar, is of key interest for traditional ABS instruments – 
especially for structures containing assets from jurisdic-
tions or market segments with a relatively small number 
of third-party servicers, where replacement servicers may 
be hard to ﬁ  nd. The importance of servicer performance 
for the robustness of structured ﬁ  nance  transactions, 
including possible interactions with legal and default 
risks, has been highlighted by the losses experienced on 
certain transactions in the US manufactured housing ABS 
markets in the late 1990s  (4).
2.2 Structured  ﬁ  nance ratings
Given the complexities described above, structured 
ﬁ  nance has, from the beginning, been largely a “rated” 
market. Issuers of structured instruments were keen to 
obtain ratings according to scales that were identical to 
those for bonds, so that investors would feel comfortable 
purchasing the new products. Investors, in turn, had an 
interest in delegating part of the assessment of these 
instruments to third parties. 
The rating agencies, in their traditional role as “delegated 
monitors” of the riskiness of debt instruments, emerged as 
a natural source for such services. The complexity of struc-
tured ﬁ  nance instruments in all likelihood heightened the 
importance of this role  (5). Interestingly, structured ﬁ  nance 
ratings are now among the largest and fastest growing 
business segments for the three leading credit rating agen-
cies, and a principal revenue source. This has given rise to 
a number of concerns, including questions about potential 
conﬂ  icts of interest based on issuer-paid fees  (6).
While much of the expertise involved in rating traditional 
debt carries over to structured ﬁ  nance, the special features 
of structured products lead to differences in the nature of 
the agencies’ rating methodologies. Importantly, struc-
tured ﬁ  nance tranches are usually tailored by arrangers 
with target ratings in mind. This, in turn, requires the 
rating agencies to take part in the deal’s structuring proc-
ess, with deal origination implicitly involving obtaining 
structuring opinions from the rating agencies. 
In practice, arrangers will routinely use the agencies’ 
publicly available models to pre-structure deals and 
subsequently engage in an iterative dialogue with the 
agencies to ﬁ  nalise their structures. This process and the 
(1)  One might argue that evaluation of subordinated debt and related assets is 
similarly complex, given various covenants and differences across national 
bankruptcy laws. We argue that evaluation of structured ﬁ  nance instruments 
entails all of that complexity, plus additional layers, due to the pooled nature 
of the underlying assets and the elaborate, often non-standardised contractual 
structures.
(2)  See, for example, Cousseran et al (2004) for a comprehensive description of these 
issues.
(3)  The underperformance of certain early CDO structures has at least partially been 
blamed on the actions of asset pool managers. The recent legal dispute over CDO 
structures named “Corvus” and “Nerva” involving HSH Nordbank and Barclays 
Capital, which was settled out of court in February, may be a case in point. 
HSH Nordbank sued Barclays Capital because of losses incurred in these CDO 
structures, which Barclays managed and in which the asset manager had included 
some tranches from other, poorly performing Barclays CDOs.
(4)  A decline in underwriting standards, combined with the servicers’ delay of 
foreclosures, which allowed delinquencies to build, ultimately resulted in higher 
than anticipated loss severities. In the wake of the economic downturn starting 
in 2000, pool deterioration became increasingly apparent, triggering substantial 
downgrades. See CGFS (2005), appendix 5, for more detailed coverage.
(5)  Indeed, work by Ammer and Clinton (2004) on pricing patterns for US ABSs 
suggests that reliance on ratings as a source of credit information seems to 
be somewhat higher in structured ﬁ  nance than in traditional bond markets. 
Speciﬁ  cally, ABS downgrades are found to have a stronger impact on prices than 
do downgrades for corporate bonds, with downgrades to speculative grade 
standing out in particular. 
(6)  Moody’s annual report for 2003 documents that structured ﬁ  nance, at $460 
million, accounted for more than 40 p.c. of its ratings revenues. Although 
separate public accounts for Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s are unavailable, 
the annual reports of their respective parent companies suggest that structured 
ﬁ  nance is of comparable importance for them too.131
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conﬁ  ned, contractual nature of a structured ﬁ  nance trans-
action allows arrangers to adapt the proﬁ  le of a tranche 
in response to pre-rating feedback, which implies that 
the process of rating these instruments has a pronounced 
“ex ante” nature. This contrasts with traditional “ex post” 
ratings, for which targeted ratings levels and pre-rating 
feedback play less of a role, owing to the limited ability of 
issuers to adjust their credit characteristics in response to 
such information. 
3.  The risks of structured ﬁ  nance
3.1  Analysing pool default risk
Ratings, as indicators of the default risk embedded in 
debt instruments, are based on expected loss (EL) or 
probabilities of default (PDs)  (1). The estimate of EL or PD 
for a structured ﬁ  nance tranche will critically depend on 
the size (i.e. “thickness”) and position of that tranche 
in the loss distribution of the underlying asset pool. To 
obtain this assessment, as highlighted above, an estimate 
of the asset pool’s loss distribution (the result of credit risk 
modelling) has to be combined with information about 
the structural speciﬁ  cs of the deal and its tranches (the 
result of structural analysis). 
The main factors driving the loss distribution of any port-
folio and, hence, the three main inputs into each agency’s 
structured ﬁ   nance rating methodology are estimates 
of :  probabilities of default of the individual obligors in 
the pool  ; recovery rates ;  and  default (time) correlations 
among the obligors within the pool. The choice of the 
approach used in conjunction with these inputs to model 
losses will depend on collateral pool speciﬁ  cs, such as the 
number and homogeneity of assets, obligor classes, and 
historical performance. In this regard, a key differentiation 
can be made between the approaches used to rate tradi-
tional ABS instruments versus those applied to CDOs. 
Traditional ABS portfolios are usually made up of large, well 
diversiﬁ  ed, homogeneous pools of assets (e.g. residential 
mortgages or credit card receivables), with no signiﬁ  cant 
individual exposures relative to overall pool size. Thus, idi-
osyncratic risk is much less important for ABSs than for 
instruments with less diversiﬁ  ed and more heterogeneous 
collateral pools. As a result, ABSs are typically rated by use 
of so-called “actuarial approaches”, which rely on the 
assumption that each originator’s unique underwriting 
policy gives rise to characteristic loss and recovery patterns 
that are reasonably stable over time. Loss and dispersion 
measures can then be reliably inferred from the loss histo-
ries of static pools of assets originated by the same lender.
CDOs, on the other hand, are “lumpy” (i.e. less granular 
than traditional ABSs) and generally contain, or are refer-
enced to, relatively small numbers of non-homogeneous 
assets. As a result, both idiosyncratic and systematic risks 
are important for pool performance, and methods used 
for calculating loss distributions for traditional ABS port-
folios are inappropriate for CDOs. 
One of the key issues affecting the assessment of the 
loss distribution for CDO portfolios is the estimation of 
default correlations among the obligors. When correlation 
is close to zero, a typical CDO’s loss distribution will have a 
skewed bell shape that is best approximated by the bino-
mial distribution. At higher correlation levels, however, 
the shape of the loss distribution changes, as probability 
mass is moved into the tails (see Chart 3). For a given level 
of expected loss, higher correlation among obligors in the 
pool thus leads to loss distributions such that the senior 
tranches bear greater risk and the most junior tranche 
beneﬁ  ts, as outcomes will be more dispersed.
Estimates of tranche risk and return, therefore, are quite 
sensitive to assumptions regarding the default correlation 
of obligors in the underlying pool. Consequently, esti-
mates of tranche EL and PD − i.e. ratings − may differ 
across rating agencies due to differences in methodologies 
and / or assumptions. This, in turn gives rise to “model risk”, 
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Source : CGFS
(1)  Ratings issued by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch are based on PDs, whereas Moody’s 
ratings are based on EL. These differences have a historical component – in order 
to enhance comparability between bond and structured ﬁ  nance ratings, each 
agency elected to base its structured ﬁ  nance ratings on the same measure used 
for its bond ratings.132
i.e. the risk that the speciﬁ  c model used to size the credit 
enhancement for a given tranche and rating may inaccu-
rately reﬂ  ect the “true” risk of the tranche. Investors, in 
turn, need to understand the model risk they are taking in 
order to demand appropriate risk-adjusted returns  (1).
3.2  Ratings and tranche risk properties
A related question is whether ratings, to the extent that 
they accurately reﬂ  ect EL or PD, are a good guide to the 
risk properties of tranched instruments. For instance, 
depending on their position in the seniority structure, 
tranches of structured ﬁ  nance instruments can be more 
leveraged than the portfolio of underlying assets : i.e. the 
more subordinated a given tranche and the “thinner” that 
tranche, the greater the probability that the holder of the 
tranche will lose a signiﬁ  cant portion of its investment.
Box 1  –  Ratings and the risk properties of structured ﬁ  nance products  (1)
Ratings are assessments of expected loss (EL) or probability of default (PD) and thus reﬂ  ect an actuarial notion of 
credit risk that depends only on the ﬁ  rst moment of the distribution of possible outcomes. Holding EL constant, 
however, an investment will tend to be riskier if its loss distribution is more dispersed. Risk proﬁ  les of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments are, therefore, more fully described when estimates of EL or PD are combined with information 
regarding the ex ante uncertainty of losses as reﬂ  ected, for example, in the variance and higher moments of the 
loss distribution. Ex ante credit loss uncertainty, in turn, has come to be commonly referred to as “unexpected loss 
(UL)”. With regard to structured ﬁ  nance, two considerations merit mention in this context : 
1/ Risk comparisons among structured ﬁ  nance tranches
Due to the additivity of EL, the process of tranching will distribute the EL of the underlying portfolio across the 
various classes of securities issued against the pool. The equity tranche, although typically the smallest tranche 
in terms of notional size, will end up bearing much of the pool’s EL. In contrast, the senior tranche, being highly 
rated, will bear only a small portion of the EL, despite laying claim to most of the structure’s principal. Tranche 
UL will exhibit similar patterns across tranches  : measured against tranche notionals, the UL of a tranche will tend 
to be higher for more junior tranches. The risk proﬁ  le of a structured ﬁ  nance tranche, in fact, depends largely on 
two factors  : its seniority (as determined by the lower boundary of the tranche) and its thickness (i.e. the distance 
between the upper and lower tranche boundaries, see Chart 3). The lower the seniority, the lower the level of loss 
protection and the higher the risk of a given tranche. The narrower the tranche, the more the loss distribution will 
tend to differ from the distribution for the entire portfolio in that it is likely to be more bimodal and, thus, riskier. 
2/ Risk comparisons with like-rated assets
Another aspect of structured ﬁ  nance is that tranching can lead to risk proﬁ  les that are substantially different from 
those of ordinary bond portfolios with the same (weighted average) rating. One factor behind this observation 
is the possibility of zero tranche recoveries for subordinated tranches. As a result, if defaults are severe enough, 
investors in all but the most senior tranches may lose the entire value of their investment even in the case of 
non-zero recoveries. The narrower the tranche, the riskier it will be, as it takes fewer defaults for the tranche to 
be wiped out once its lower loss boundary has been breached. Subordinated tranches, therefore, have a wider 
distribution of outcomes than like-rated bond portfolios and will thus need to pay a higher spread than traditional 
debt instruments to compensate for the added risk.
(1)  See CGFS (2005), Gibson (2004) and Meli and Rappoport (2003).
(1)  See Fender and Kiff (2004) for a comparison of the rating agencies’ approaches 
for CDO modelling and a description of the key role played by default correlation 
in understanding model risk; Amato and Gyntelberg (2005) show how the price 
sensitivities of tranched instruments depend on default correlations.133
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As explained in Box 1, the variety of possible risk proﬁ  les 
generated through tranching can lead to substantial 
differences, in terms of unexpected loss and the timing 
of losses, among tranches as well as between tranches 
and ordinary bond portfolios. Importantly, these differ-
ences apply even when the two instruments have the 
same expected loss or probability of default. As a result, 
tranched products can have risk properties that differ 
substantially from those of equally rated bond portfolio 
exposures. An important implication is that, due to the 
joint effects of pooling and tranching, ratings of structured 
ﬁ  nance products are likely to provide only an incomplete 
description of their riskiness relative to traditional instru-
ments. In particular, as “tail events” tend to be more likely 
than for like-rated traditional instruments, undue reliance 
by structured ﬁ  nance investors on ratings can thus lead to 
unintended exposures to unexpected loss.
Structured ﬁ   nance and bond ratings differ not only in 
the conceptual dimensions highlighted above, but also in 
terms of the empirically observed rating stability over time. 
Given the pooled nature of structured ﬁ  nance products, 
and resulting diversiﬁ  cation, they might be expected to 
– and indeed do – exhibit greater average ratings stability. 
Empirical studies suggest, in particular, that the volatility 
of structured ﬁ   nance ratings is signiﬁ   cantly lower than 
for corporate bonds, although the average number of 
notches per structured ﬁ   nance rating change appears 
to be higher – perhaps reﬂ   ecting their higher inherent 
leverage described earlier. The likelihood of a rating 
change, therefore, is smaller in structured ﬁ  nance, while 
the magnitude of the change, when it occurs, is larger. 
At the same time, the results for structured ﬁ  nance 
products taken as a whole mask signiﬁ  cant differences 
across different types of structured instruments, and 
particular asset classes seem to exhibit a markedly higher 
rate of downgrades than bonds  (1).
4. Some  implications
While structured ﬁ   nance instruments can contribute to 
market completion and a better dispersion of credit risk, they 
also give rise to a number of questions with potential ﬁ  nan-
cial stability implications. One of these is whether adding 
structured instruments to an institution’s portfolio might lead 
to unanticipated risk concentrations. A closely associated 
question is whether ratings-related investment mandates 
and similar constraints are effective in deﬁ  ning maximum 
levels of risk when structured ﬁ  nance is an eligible asset class.
The discussion above suggests that tranched securities 
pose unique challenges to the application of ratings-based 
constraints in that a greater likelihood of “tail events” is 
not captured by ratings ranking expected loss or probabil-
ity of default. Transaction-speciﬁ  c documentation makes 
the task of assessing the riskiness of tranched instruments 
even more difﬁ  cult, which in turn may increase investors’ 
reliance on ratings for “due diligence” purposes. And, 
even when asset managers do fully understand the risks 
they are taking, they may still be tempted to employ struc-
tured securities to increase portfolio risk to levels that are 
higher than what was intended by those who designed 
their investment mandates. By implication, market par-
ticipants and supervisors should not rely exclusively on 
ratings when setting risk limits for credit portfolios  (2).
Model risk is another important concern, being tightly 
linked to the complexity of structured products and to 
the sensitivity of tranche risk to differing assumptions 
embodied in estimates of the asset pool loss distribu-
tion  (3).  Importantly, any effect of mis-speciﬁ  ed  model 
inputs, such as default correlation, may be magniﬁ  ed by 
governance issues, as equity tranche holders favour asset 
pools composed of obligors with high default correla-
tions, at the expense of senior note holders. 
In addition, it should be noted that model risk is a feature 
also of the pricing models used by deal arrangers and 
other market participants. As these models have to date 
been largely untested by a truly major stress event, even 
the most sophisticated market participants may thus need 
to be careful when trading structured instruments, given 
the resulting scope for mis-priced or mis-managed expo-
sures. A related point is that adding tranched products to 
existing exposures in a portfolio raises issues regarding the 
management of correlations on the portfolio level – par-
ticularly for “correlation-intensive” instruments, such as 
CDOs based on tranches of other CDOs. 
Fortunately, these issues appear to be reasonably well 
understood by many, if not most, market participants. 
Market surveys suggest that investors do not rely exclu-
sively on ratings for their structured ﬁ  nance investment 
decisions  ; rather, they tend to see ratings as only one 
element of a broader process of risk management. In 
addition, those investors who lack the capacity to analyse 
(1)  One such example is CDOs, for which Moody’s reports a downgrade-to-upgrade 
ratio of 19.0 for 1991–2002, as compared with long-term ratios of 1.2 for all 
structured ﬁ  nance products and 2.3 for corporate bonds. According to market 
sources, this record was primarily driven by an extraordinarily high rate of defaults 
and downgrades for bonds included in CDO pools and by shared concentrations 
in particular obligors. See also Violi (2004).
(2)  The new regulatory capital requirements for banks’ holdings of securitisations, 
as speciﬁ  ed in the new Basel II framework, may be seen as a reﬂ  ection of these 
considerations. They not only take account of the rating assigned to a tranche, 
but also explicitly incorporate factors such as the level of subordination of the 
tranche and the granularity of the underlying asset pool. For more details on 
the different approaches for computing regulatory capital for securitisations, see 
CGFS (2005), Box 6.
(3)  Note that model risk is also present in bond ratings. However, given the less 
quantitative nature of the bond rating process, model risk is arguably more 
pronounced and its sources more easily identiﬁ  able in structured ﬁ  nance ratings.134
complex structured ﬁ  nance instruments, such as CDOs, 
claim to avoid using them (see CGFS (2005) and ECB 
(2004)). However, to the extent that structured ﬁ  nance 
markets are broadening to include less sophisticated 
institutions and retail investors, the risk of unanticipated 
losses is real.
The rapid evolution of structured ﬁ  nance markets implies 
that new structures and asset classes are continually being 
introduced. As a result, unfamiliar structures create new 
opportunities for unanticipated behaviour by note holders 
or third parties, while the scarcity of data on the historical 
performance of new asset classes introduces additional 
model risk. Given the issues highlighted in this article and 
the fact that the structured ﬁ  nance market remains largely 
untested, policy makers and market participants alike 
have an interest in following closely the developments in 
these markets and in attempting to understand the core 
challenges faced.135
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